Since Protagoras' classic “man is the measure of all things,” claims of relativism and counter-claims have been tendered. The nineteenth century saw Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Westermarck, Pareto, Marx, and others, suggesting that institutions, customs, moral codes, and the like, are “relative” both to the culture and to the time. At the crest of this wave of “relativism” surged a vicious claim: that truth and knowledge itself were merely functions of particular conditions. The “validity” of knowledge was said to be at the (...) whim of historic, social factors. Not only is no theory really true; no particular statement is ever so. Not only is no theory or statement really true; no theory of knowledge has thus far ever been free from the bias of its genesis. There have been no absolute insights for epistemology. Or so, at least, it was claimed. (shrink)

In a recent paper I criticized the pragmatist theory of truth from the frame of reference of modern logical positivism. By showing the similarity between Karl Mannheim's claims of epistemological relevance for sociology of knowledge and certain pragmatist notions concerning truth I made criticism of the latter with the former. The aim of this present paper is to extend and elaborate upon those critical remarks regarding pragmatism both in order to answer objections raised since and to clarify what was said (...) there. Moreover, the evaluation of the pragmatist theory of truth may have been surprising to some since so much lately has been made of the points of agreement between pragmatism and modern positivism. It is thus also my intent to delimit agreements and disagreements and compare the respective emphases in pragmatist and positivist thought concerning the nature of truth. (shrink)

Prompted by Alfred Landé's appraisal of individual indeterminacy in both ordinary and quantum games of chance, this paper suggests an alternative assessment in terms of the model-structure of physical theory. Whereas Landé explains such indeterminacy by appeal to "the Leibnitzian principle" of causal continuity, the author sees no need for such a special explanation. Instead, he indicates how the partial interpretation of the kinetic and quantum models limits us to statistical generalities--to limited "areas of relative chance." The alleged indeterminism of (...) physics thus resides in the model and its partial interpretation in the sense that the statistical nature of statements about "the next throw" or about individual particles is built into the model that enables the scientist to talk at all about such outcomes or entities. (shrink)

Can history be objective? Is history a science or humanistic discipline? What is its subject-matter? These three questions are variations on a single theme—the objectivity of history—which I want to explore. Faced with the welter of claims and counter-claims regarding objectivity in history, there is need to be explicit about one's approach to these claims. My prime endeavor in this paper is to reformulate these questions from my scheme of reference. I want to consider the objectivity of historical knowledge from (...) a framework that does justice both to philosophic and methological issues and to historical knowledge-claims themselves. How this philosophic framework be labeled is immaterial. What is alone important is that it does distinguish philosophy proper from both science and its methodological analysis. Confusion between the three, I believe, frequently generates problems out of whole cloth. The result is that obfuscation of issues present in much recent literature concerning history. (shrink)

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In a recent article JRS , 68 f. Nicholas Horsfall sought to demonstrate that Corythus, which Virgil makes the original home of Dardanus , should be identified with Tarquinii, some 50 miles north-west of Rome, on the coast of Etruria, rather than with Cortona, roughly twice as far away, to the north, and inland. In doing so he expressed surprise that the Virgilian evidence should have been completely ignored by previous writers on the subject : and, using the Aeneid (...) as the main source on which his own argument was based, he supported his conclusion with a careful examination of several other aspects of the problem. (shrink)

In a recent article JRS, 68 f. Nicholas Horsfall sought to demonstrate that Corythus, which Virgil makes the original home of Dardanus, should be identified with Tarquinii, some 50 miles north-west of Rome, on the coast of Etruria, rather than with Cortona, roughly twice as far away, to the north, and inland. In doing so he expressed surprise that the Virgilian evidence should have been completely ignored by previous writers on the subject : and, using the Aeneid as the (...) main source on which his own argument was based, he supported his conclusion with a careful examination of several other aspects of the problem. (shrink)

Les dynamiques industrielles du capitalisme sont liées aux transformations des structures organisationnelles de production. Ainsi, la firme verticalement intégrée à la Chandler s’est effacée au profit de firmes modernes désintégrées. Cette profonde transformation de l’environnement industriel, qui s’est manifestée dans les années 1980 et 1990, a conduit les firmes à développer de nouvelles stratégies de coopération inter-firmes et à faire émerger des formes de quasi-intégration verticale. L’objectif de cet article est d’analyser ces changements institutionnels à l’aune de la théorie économique. (...) L’article se focalise sur les travaux originaux de trois auteurs influents qui ont développé leur propre approche de la quasi-intégration dans la seconde moitié du xx e siècle : Williamson, Houssiaux et Blois. (shrink)

Expressions of the form 'S is aware of the fact that p' are commonplace. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than (...) knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)